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NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo is a highly controversial issue 
due to its violation of the general rule in the international law that prohibits the 
use of force, even in the case of a humanitarian crisis. What is also unique about 
the Kosovo case is the fact that during this conflict the international society 
witnessed the first major use of destructive armed force that had been 
undertaken with the stated purpose of implementing UN Security Council 
resolutions, but without the Security Council authorization; the first major 
bombing campaign intended to bring a halt to crimes against humanity being 
committed by a state within its own borders; and the first bombing campaign of 
which it could be claimed that it had on its own, and without sustained land 
operations, brought about a major change of policy by the target government. 
Nevertheless, one of the major questions that inevitably come up  is whether the 
use of military force was the only way of putting an end to the humanitarian 
crisis in Kosovo. 
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There is no easy way for understanding NATO’s military intervention in 
the Kosovo conflict, more precisely, the bombing campaign in 1999. The               
11-week bombing campaign conducted by NATO in spring 1999 against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) has many claims to uniqueness. It was the 
first sustained use of armed force by the NATO alliance in its so-year  existence; 
the first time a major use of destructive armed force had been undertaken with 
the stated purpose of implementing UN Security Council resolutions, but 
without Security Council authorization; the first major bombing campaign 
intended to bring a halt to crimes against humanity being committed by a state 
within its own borders; and the first bombing campaign of which it could be 
claimed that it had on its own, and without sustained land operations, brought 
about a major change of policy by the target government. All these factors 
together make “NATO’s air strikes on Serbia one of the most significant aspects 
of Western intervention in the Balkans at the end of the twentieth century.” 
(Williams, 2001:4). 
The official claim is that NATO’s actions were “driven by concerns 
about the human rights situation in Kosovo and the implications of a further 
escalation of the latent conflict there” (Williams, 2001:79).  On the other hand, 
there is a second view which states that beyond these, there were other reasons, 
of a more complex, strategic nature. “It has been argued that NATO’s military 
intervention was dictated predominantly by the need to establish a new role for 
itself in the post-Cold War conflict. Events in Kosovo, it is alleged, proved the 
ideal opportunity to do so. Supporters of this point of view point to a perceived 
implacable stance adopted by NATO with regard to Milosevic in March 1999 
and its refusal to pursue a diplomatic solution, preferring instead to impose 
terms it new there were too humiliating for Serbs to accept.” (Williams, 2001:4). 
One thing is sure: NATO’s air strikes on Serbia marked one of the most 
significant aspects of Western intervention in the Balkans at the end of the 
twentieth century. 
The questions that inevitably arise when we talk about the Kosovo 
conflict are the following:    What were NATO’s objectives? Why did NATO 
use force? Should NATO have used force? What other alternatives were 
available, if there were any? 
Before going into the debate concerning the diplomatic alternatives, it 
would be useful to clarify the idea of “humanitarian intervention” and how this 
applies to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. 
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NATO’s Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo 
 
NATO’s 11-week bombardment has been widely characterized as a 
“humanitarian intervention”. NATO leaders were reluctant to call their action 
'war'. However, it was war - albeit war of a peculiarly asymmetric kind. It 
indisputably involved large scale and opposed use of force against a foreign state 
and its armed forces. Because it was justified principally in terms of stopping 
actual and anticipated Serb killings and expulsions in the Serbian province of 
Kosovo, the campaign was sometimes colloquially called a 'humanitarian war'.  
Throughout the air campaign, NATO leaders repeatedly emphasized 
five objectives which Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic was required to 
accept: a verifiable cessation of all combat activities and killings; withdrawal of 
Serb military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo; the deployment of an 
international military force; the return of all refugees and unimpeded access for 
humanitarian aid; and a political framework for Kosovo building on the 
Rambouillet Accords 
According to Aleksandar Joki , “NATO’s humanitarian bombs killed 
between 500 and 1800 civilians and wounded thousands more. They hit not 
only military forces and facilities, but also destroyed Yugoslavia’s entire public 
infrastructure, inflicting an estimated $ 4 billion of damage on bridges, highways, 
railroads, civilian airports, hospitals, schools, oil refineries, factories, 
construction equipment, media centers, apartment buildings, houses, buses, 
electrical plants, and hundreds of acres of forest.” (Jokic, 2003:121). 
However, I would say that the main problem concerning this issue is 
that “the record of post-war intervention does not lend much support to the 
overall proposition that the use of force has promoted humanitarian values” 
(Janzekovic, 2006:129). The intervention's critics insist that NATO actions 
worsened a bad situation. They argue that most war crimes and ethnic cleansing 
occurred in Kosovo occurred after the NATO bombing began. “During this 
period [the first eight weeks of NATO action in Kosovo], over 850,000 
Kosovar refugees were forced at gunpoint out of Kosovo and reportedly 
subjected to widespread abuse by Serb forces. These Kosovars would have an 
entirely different notion of so-called success of humanitarian intervention in the 
Balkans.” (Janzekovic, 2006:7).  
The humanitarian outcome of international intervention in Kosovo was 
not the best possible outcome because NATO refused to use ground troops, 
utility was not maximized and many people died. NATO’s response was not an 
adequately robust response to more than a decade of deliberate Serb aggression 
and atrocities in Balkans. Moreover, there was a real possibility that Serb forces 
would immediately start killing as many Kosovars as possible if NATO attacked 
using air power alone. NATO’s military response was not proportional to the 
threat.  
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NATO should have used ground troops, if they actually thought that 
military intervention was the only alternative, in order to stop Serb attacks in 
Kosovo. “Air power alone took too long and it did not quickly stop the killing. 
NATO action did not do what it specifically intended to do, which was to stop 
Serbs killing and displacing Kosovars.” (Janzekovic, 2006:53).  
This having been said, I shall return to the debate over whether there 
were or not diplomatic alternatives to the military intervention, which, as I have 
shown, didn’t actually reached the proposed objectives. 
 
Reconsidering the Diplomatic Alternatives 
 
Basically, there are two “schools of thought”, so to speak, on NATO’s 
action in Kosovo. The first, with which I also agree, stresses upon the fact that 
the West was wrong to intervene at all or wrong not to consider other options, 
such as economic sanctions or blockades. Among those who share this view,      
I would mention Tariq Ali, Noam Chomsky and Peter Gowan, who are highly 
critical on Western’s actions (Williams, 2001:30).  
On the other hand, there is a second line of interpretation, which 
includes key decision makers and the heads of the states throughout the 
Western alliances, and claims that NATO’s actions against Serbia were justified 
and that military intervention was the only way to stop the conflict.  
I shall first deal with the first argument, that is the claim that there were 
diplomatic alternatives to military intervention.  
According to this line of interpretation, the primary motivation for the 
bombardment was not humanitarian. “It was US’ desire to maintain its status as 
a sole superpower in the world. Control of Europe, through the strengthening 
of US-led NATO, will ensure hegemony over the transport of rich oil deposits 
from the Caspian Sea as well as control of European markets. The American 
military bases in the Balkans-including Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo, the largest 
US base constructed since the Vietnam War-provide a counterweight to Russian 
dominance” (Jokic, 2003:121). So, even if there were diplomatic alternatives to 
military intervention, American interests prevailed over the real objective of 
stopping the conflict in the most peaceful way possible. NATO’s resort to 
bombing meant that other alternatives and possible solutions to the crisis were 
ignored.  
Now, as we can see, there is some reason to think that all other 
possibilities for changing the situation the Albanians in Kosovo had not been 
exhausted.  
During the Hague Appeal Conference, it was generally agreed on the 
fact that there was an alternative to NATO air strikes on Serbia and Kosovo 
that would have saved more lives than the bombing campaign. In brief, UN 
endorsement for a large peacekeeping force might have been obtained; at least a 
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greater effort should have been made. Such a force, together with the OSCE 
observers who were in Kosovo could have protected civilians — which 
bombing could not do. The key NATO states, which are also major players on 
the UN Security Council, could have made an effort to keep non-NATO 
countries, especially Russia, involved and helping. This should have been done 
at and after the Rambouillet negotiations and also earlier at Dayton when 
Kosovo was kept off the agenda. If Russia had been involved as an intermediary 
with Milosevic, efforts to avoid a Security Council veto of a UN peacekeeping 
plan might have succeeded. And, if the Council had not been ready to endorse 
action to maintain peace, the General Assembly could have acted under the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950, which like the proposed Council action, 
would have needed to be under Chapter VII of the Charter since Yugoslavia 
would not invite the United Nations, or anyone, in to stanch the gross violations 
of human rights within its borders (Webster, epsusa.com).  
Apart from these considerations, another important aspect regarding the 
international diplomatic efforts is that during the summer of 1998 the highest-
profile diplomat in the Balkans, representing the most powerful nation in the 
world, Richard Holbrooke had told the KLA that independence was within 
reach; second, the KLA was not included in the October agreement that 
provided KLA tactical leverage on the ground in Kosovo; and third, that some 
of the great powers- through their representatives in OSCE’s KVM were 
providing maps and communication equipment to the KLA. This signal of 
support could hardly be missed, and it would be fair to argue that this must have 
boosted KLA’s morale, speeded up its desire for further international 
involvement (i.e., by NATO), and deepened its belief that the independence was 
within reach. In other words, the KLA had nothing to lose from the ongoing 
process (Henrksen, 2007:159). 
Therefore, as complex and contentious as the Kosovo conflict was, we 
can still identify a series of non-violent resolution, so I disagree that military 
intervention was the least-bad option at that time. In Faith and Force, David 
Clough states that the short-term and long term approach toward the Balkans 
should have been cooperative conflict resolution. By that he doesn’t mean to say 
that conflict resolution is a panacea but that its possibilities are often left 
unexplored, as it is in the care of the Balkan crisis. Moreover, he claims that 
representatives of Kosovars should have been included in the Dayton peace 
process, and the status of Kosovo should have already been addressed in the 
Dayton peace process of 1995. We can identify here the same idea included in 
the discussions at the Hague Appeal Conference. Another resemblance with the 
major ideas sustained at the Hague Conference is that the United States should 
have worked cooperatively with Russia to establish the terms that Russia would 
accept in the Rambouillet Accords. The anti-war story insists that the Russians 
were marginalized at Rambouillet, were excluded from key Contact Group 
decisions, and were kept in the dark about the controversial Appendix B. 
  87
SOCEA,I., E.,(2009) NATO’s Military Intervention in Kosovo and the Diplomatic Alternative, Revista Românească pentru 
Educaţie Multidimensională, Year 1, No. 1, August, pp : 83-92 NATO’s Military Intervention in  
Kosovo and the Diplomatic Alternative 
Iulia Elena Socea 
 
According to Ken Booth and others, this unilateral approach to peacemaking 
has irrevocably damaged relations between NATO and Russia in such a way that 
will make future security cooperation in Europe highly problematic (Booth, 
2001:226).  
Also, various UN members were concerned about KLA’s use of force 
use of force and its designs for power. In this regard, strong efforts should have 
been made to incorporate moderate and constructive Kosovar Albanian leaders 
such as Ibraim Rugova, at the earliest stage possible. In addition to this, if the 
UN,  the  United  States,  and  the  EU  had  previously  made  long                      
term-commitments to the region, they would have encouraged more 
cooperative attitudes by leaders and better feelings among the population of the 
Balkan republics (Clough, 2007:105).  
As we can see, much reference is made to the Rambouillet Accords as a 
potential diplomatic solution, an effort which is claimed to have failed.  
Nevertheless, I would say that the text of the Accords weren’t designed 
in such a way as to provide a viable diplomatic alternative to military 
intervention. I would actually say that the Kosovo conflict might have been 
avoided if the West had adopted a more conciliatory, less aggressive stance 
towards Milosevic. As Christopher Layne points out, Milosevic was forced to 
negotiate at Rambouillet with “a gun at his head” (Layne, 1993:6). Like any 
trapped rat, Milosevic had no choice but to try and fight his way out. The stories 
about Rambouillet that are told by the anti-war lobby share some characteristics, 
all of which intimate the general claim that NATO is either utterly incompetent 
or, like the Habsburgs nearly ninety years earlier, deliberately made the terms of 
the ultimatum unpalatable to the Serbs, because it wanted to give the FRY a 
‘punishment beating’ (Mccgwure, 2000). As Chomsky put it, “it has been 
speculated that the wording was designed so as to guarantee rejection. Perhaps 
so. It is hard to imagine that any country would consider such terms except in 
the form of unconditional surrender” (Chomsky, 1999:107).  
The first generally agreed feature of the Rambouillet Accords is that 
Rambouillet was a biased pretext for bombing, not an equitable political 
solution. The Rambouillet accord, the U.S./NATO "peace plan" for Kosovo 
was presented to Yugoslavia as an ultimatum. It was a "take it or leave it" 
proposition, as Albright often emphasized back in February. There were, in fact, 
no negotiations at all, and no sovereign, independent state could have signed the 
Rambouillet agreement. And, as Christopher Layne argued, the Rambouillet was 
“a textbook example of how not to practice diplomacy” (Layne, 1999:6). The 
whole process, he says, was biased against the FRY and that “the United States 
effectively took sides- the KLA’s- in a civil war.  
Secondly, the Interim Settlement was unacceptable because it would 
have heavily affected Serbia’s legitimate claim to sovereignty. The accord 
provided for a very broad form of autonomy for Kosovo. Kosovo would have 
its own parliament, president, Prime Minister, Supreme Court and security 
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forces under Rambouillet. The new Kosovo government would be able to 
negate laws of the federal republic's legislature (unlike U.S. states) and conduct 
its own foreign policy. All Yugoslav federal army and police forces would have 
to be withdrawn, except for a 3-mile wide stretch along the borders of the 
province.   A new Kosovar police force would be trained to take over internal 
security responsibilities. Members of the U.S.-backed KLA (Kosovo Liberation 
Army) which is supposed to disarm under the agreement could join the police 
units. 
But, in reality, neither the Kosovo police, the KLA, nor the Yugoslav 
federal forces would be the basic state apparatus under Rambouillet: That 
function would be reserved for NATO. A 28,000-strong NATO occupation 
army, known as the KFOR, would be authorized to "use necessary force to 
ensure compliance with the Accords" (commondreams.org). 
As has been reported in the mainstream media, the Yugoslav 
government indicated its willingness to accept the autonomy part of the 
agreement, but rejected other sections, including the occupation of Kosovo by 
NATO, as a violation of its national sovereignty and independence.  
Appendix B of the Accords this appendix would have been utterly 
unpalatable for any sovereign state, other than a state that had already been 
defeated in a war.  
Also, the argument is that Rambouillet envisaged the unaccountable rule 
of Kosovo by the North Atlantic Council. Eric Herring, for example, pointed 
out that the Rambouillet text made no mention of NATO being accountable to 
any outside organization, and particularly not to the United Nations (UN) 
(Herring, 2000:3). 
The accord blatantly violates Yugoslavia's sovereignty such a 
provocative a manner that it cannot have been accidental. It is not difficult to 
imagine a working group in the State Department charged with the task of 
thinking up the most intrusive and insulting clauses possible to insert into the 
agreement. 
I would even say that U.S. policymakers never intended for Yugoslavia's 
leadership to sign this document.  Some of the anti-war writers say that the 
Rambouillet was just another step in the preparation for war. The role of 
Rambouillet in this process was to put the on us, unfairly, on the Yugoslav side 
for the failure to achieve a peaceful resolution, in order to justify the massive 
bombing of the entire country. According to Ken Booth, Appendix B was a 
“joker” thrown into the pack to ensure the failure of the talks and legitimate the 
war (Both, 2001). That “joker”, according to Christopher Layne, was the right 
for NATO to “deploy” anywhere on the territory of the FRY. According to 
Peter Gowan, the joker was thrown in because “the Clinton administration was 
seeking a war against Yugoslavia as a means for achieving political goals outside 
the Balkans altogether” (Gowan, 1999:2).  
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In addition to this, we should also take into consideration another 
important aspect: the Interim Settlement was not the only diplomatic solution 
available. Serbia had actually proposed a peace plan offering substantial 
autonomy for Kosovo, in effect restoring the autonomy withdrawn in 1989, but 
this proposition was ignored by NATO. According to Chomsky, the 
parliamentary resolution rejected the NATO ultimatum and called upon the 
OSCE and UN to facilitate a peaceful settlement. Would the plan have led to 
Kosovo’s independence? No, but bombing wasn’t intended either. Also, we 
don’t know for sure if it would have lead to real autonomy, but again, we don’t 
know because NATO never pursued the matter. But in any event, the question 
is not whether negotiations would have lead to the perfectly just outcome, but 
whether they would have enhanced, rather than detracted from, the cause of 
justice and humanitarianism more than the bombing campaign has done.   
This having been said, I shall briefly present the contrary view regarding 
the resolution of the conflict, the view which stresses upon the limits of the 
non-military intervention in the case of Kosovo and the gravity of the situation. 
 
Military intervention- the one and the only solution? 
 
This line of interpretation broadly says that the main reason for the 
NATO military intervention were humanitarian and that the West, in NATO’s 
guise intervened in order to save a whole ethnic group of people from the 
repression of the Serbs, bent on mass deportation and indiscriminate killing of 
civilians.  
 
NATO’s "Historical Overview" claims: 
During 1998, open conflict between Serbian military and police forces 
and Kosovar Albanian forces resulted in the deaths of over 1,500 Kosovar 
Albanians and forced 400,000 people from their homes. The international 
community became gravely concerned about the escalating conflict, its 
humanitarian consequences, and the risk of it spreading to other countries. 
President Milosevic's disregard for diplomatic efforts aimed at peacefully 
resolving the crisis and the destabilizing role of militant Kosovar Albanian 
forces was also of concern (nato.int).  
 
In the view of those who support NATO’s actions, Kosovo situation 
does meet the strict criteria for a justified intervention. A defenseless people 
have been driven from their homes and their arrival in Albania and Macedonia 
had destabilized a strategically important region.  In their interpretation, the 
claim that the situation got worse after the beginning of NATO bombing stands 
only if Milosevic is telling the truth and the deportees were driven out by 
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NATO bombing but according to western intelligence, the Operation 
Horseshoe was already under way before NATO air strikes (skidelsky.com). 
Moreover, they claim that Serbian policy has never been an internal 
matter: in Kosovo, Milosevic decided to solve an “internal” human rights 
problem by exporting an entire nation to his impoverished neighbors and by 
that he destabilized and entire region and guaranteed that there will be armed 
conflict until the Kosovars can rule themselves free from of Serb repression.  
In addition to this, to the argument that NATO’s actions have sent a 
message that force, rather than law, governs international affairs, the supporters 
of the military intervention claim that, on the contrary, there are occasions in 
which if force is not used there is no future law. Failure to reverse the most 
meticulous deportation of a civilian nation since the Second World War would 
have set a fatal precedent wherever authoritarian leaders believe that force 




There was no internationally-significant human-rights crisis in Kosovo 
immediately prior to the NATO bombardment that justified its intervention on 
behalf of the ethnic-Albanian population. In arguing for a humanitarian 
intervention, NATO applied a standard to Kosovo that it does not apply to 
other countries, such as Turkey, the U.S., or Israel for that matter. The 
problems of warfare that existed in Kosovo were largely a result of U.S. support 
for the KLA, with the intent of causing a crisis that justified intervention. 
Proponents of the NATO intervention cannot argue that the intervention was 
humanitarian. The intervention was illegal, destructive, and based on fraudulent 
claims. 
NATO’s argument for the intervention is false or misleading at best. 
First, the conflict between the Serbian government and KLA forces was initiated 
by NATO in order to create a situation that justified intervention. Second, 
despite NATO’s revisionist history, no refugee crisis existed until after NATO 
began its bombardment. William Blum points out that in the real historical 
timeline, and not NATO’s, the New York Times of March 26 1999 wrote, 
"With the NATO bombing already begun, a deepening sense of fear took hold 
in Pristina [the main city of Kosovo] that Serbs would now vent their rage against 
ethnic Albanian citizens in retaliation. […] Civilians only began to flee after the 
bombing because NATO bombs, not vengeful Serbs, pushed Kosovars into 
safer ground" (Blum, 2000:166).  
The Rambouillet Accords, which could have provided a viable 
diplomatic solution for the conflict, were intentionally designed in such a way 
that no sovereign, independent state would have signed it, as I have shown 
above. Moreover, the Serbian proposition for a peaceful settlement was not 
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taken into consideration. Therefore, I would say that the intervention is better 
understood in terms of NATO’s objectives, others than the so called 
“humanitarian” ones.  
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